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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we must address the scope of § 510 of 
the Employment Retirement Income & Security Act ("ERISA") to 
determine whether appellant-employee Teresa Kowalski ("Kowalski") 
stands protected from her employer's alleged retaliatory 
discharge.  Kowalski argues that the district court incorrectly 
granted summary judgment in favor of appellee-employer L & F 
Products ("L & F").  Kowalski has alleged that L & F terminated 
her for exercising her right to receive certain disability 
benefits. 
 We hold that Kowalski has raised a cognizable cause of 
action under § 510 for retaliatory termination notwithstanding 
the fact that she had received her benefits prior to being 
terminated.  In addition, for the reasons set forth in section 
III of this opinion, we will vacate the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of L & F. 
I. 
 L & F employed Teresa Kowalski as a packaging operator 
from April 23, 1984 until January 29, 1993.  Kowalski's duties as 
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a packaging operator required her to spend the entirety of her 
eight and a half hour shift on her feet.  In June 1991, Kowalski 
informed L & F's company nurse that she had developed bunions on 
each foot.  On the advice of her doctor, Kowalski decided to 
undergo separate operations1 to remove each bunion.  Between 
June 7, 1991 and October 21, 1991, Kowalski took a medical leave 
of absence for the first bunionectomy and received full medical 
benefits under L & F's Short Term Disability Plan (the "Plan"). 
Thereafter, Kowalski returned to work.  Almost a year later, she 
took another leave of absence for the second bunionectomy and 
again received full medical benefits under the Plan. 
 During Kowalski's second leave of absence, L & F's 
human resource manager, Rob King, hired a private investigator to 
determine whether Kowalski was actually disabled and entitled to 
the benefits she was receiving.  The investigator produced a 
report to King stating that Kowalski had been "clean[ing] 
professional offices" during her medical leave of absence.  App. 
at 74-75.  Relying on this report, L & F fired Kowalski on 
January 29, 1993.  App. at 74. 
 In his deposition, King testified that he relied 
heavily on the investigator's summary of written statements made 
by two "witnesses," Diane Laich and Dr. Lapkin, both of which 
suggested only that Kowalski had contracted to provide cleaning 
services during the period of her disability.  The investigator 
prepared a written synopsis of Laich's and Dr. Lapkin's 
                     
1
 This operation is called a "bunionectomy." 
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statements, which summarily concluded that Kowalski was engaged 
in the performance of cleaning services during the period of her 
medical leave. 
 Neither Laich nor Dr. Lapkin testified or stated that 
they ever saw Kowalski performing cleaning services.  Laich, in a 
certified statement to the district court, stated that Kowalski 
had contracted to provide cleaning services for a local church. 
App. at 50.  Laich also stated that she was aware that Kowalski's 
son and another woman were providing cleaning services at the 
church.  King admitted that he never compared the investigator's 
synopsis of Laich's and Dr. Lapkin's written statements to their 
actual statements prior to terminating Kowalski.  App. at 73-75. 
 Despite his own testimony that it is important to 
consider an employee's version of events before deciding to 
terminate that employee, King refused to consider Kowalski's 
responses to the investigator's conclusions.  In particular, 
Kowalski had informed King that she owned a cleaning service, but 
did not engage in providing cleaning services herself during the 
period of her disability.2  Nevertheless, King did not allow 
Kowalski the opportunity to provide any evidence to support her 
claim. 
 Kowalski filed this lawsuit alleging that her discharge 
violated § 510 of ERISA.  The district court granted L & F's 
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Kowalski 
                     
2
 King testified that it is not against L & F company policy 
for an employee who owns his or her own business to receive 
disability payments.  App. at 77. 
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failed to show that L & F's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for termination was pretextual; and (2) Kowalski failed to offer 
any evidence of L & F's intention to retaliate against her for 
exercising her right to medical leave benefits. 
II. 
 As a threshold matter, we must determine whether 
Kowalski, as a plaintiff suing under § 510 of ERISA, has a 
cognizable cause of action notwithstanding the fact that she 
received her ERISA-protected benefits from her employer prior to 
termination.  Our review of this issue of law is plenary. Gavalik 
v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 850 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 Section 510 of ERISA provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, 
or discriminate against a participant or 
beneficiary for exercising any right to which 
he is entitled under the provisions of an 
employee benefit plan, . . . or for the 
purpose of interfering with the attainment of 
any right to which such participant may 
become entitled under the plan. 
29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 Thus, the plain language of § 510 provides a cause of 
action for employees who have been discharged "for exercising any 
right" to which employees are entitled to under an ERISA-
protected benefit plan.  But section 510 also goes further, 
protecting employees from interference with the "attainment of 
any right to which [the employees] may become entitled."  We have 
recognized that Congress enacted § 510 primarily to prevent 
employers from discharging or harassing their employees in order 
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to keep them from obtaining ERISA-protected benefits.  Gavalik, 
812 F.2d at 851. 
 L & F argues that, because Kowalski had received all of 
her benefits prior to termination, her claim must fail.  In 
particular, L & F argues that Congress enacted § 510 to prevent 
companies from avoiding their ERISA obligations and that a 
plaintiff who has received the benefits flowing from an 
employer's ERISA obligations is not entitled to protection under 
the statute.  
 Although few courts have addressed whether a plaintiff-
employee has a cognizable ERISA cause of action where the 
plaintiff received his or her ERISA-protected benefits prior to 
termination, at least one Court of Appeals has indicated a 
willingness to recognize such a cause of action.  In Kimbro v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989), the 
plaintiff claimed that he was unlawfully discharged because he 
had used his sick leave benefits.  The Ninth Circuit ultimately 
determined that the plaintiff in Kimbro failed to establish a 
prima facie case; however, it also recognized a potential cause 
of action for "unfair reprisal for use of ERISA-protected 
benefits."  Id. at 881; see also Bailey v. Policy Management 
Systems Corp., 814 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (recognizing 
that a plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated for 
submitting approximately $40,000 in claims to her employer stated 
a claim under § 510 of ERISA). 
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 Given the peculiar factual posture of this case and 
others like it, the dearth of case law directly on point is 
understandable.  The district court recognized that: 
It seems anomalous for an employer to pay all 
the benefits due an employee and then 
immediately terminate the employment 
relationship.  Once an employer has made the 
investment in its employee by providing 
medical disability benefits, it seems only 
logical that the employer would hope the 
employee would return to work.  To terminate 
an employee days after receiving full 
benefits is illogical (emphasis in original). 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 12.  Nonetheless, whether it is or is not 
logical for an employer to act a particular way is largely 
irrelevant for purposes of discerning whether Congress intended 
to protect employees from that particular type of employer 
behavior. 
 It is hard to imagine any rational construction of the 
"for exercising any right" language in § 510 that would indicate 
that Congress intended that the protections provided to employees 
by § 510 would not extend to the type of retaliatory discharge 
that is alleged in this case.  There is simply no limiting 
language in § 510 that suggests that only future benefits are 
protected.  We are bound to recognize and effectuate Congress' 
intent where it is clear from the language of a statute.  See 
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) 
(courts must presume that "a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there"); Moskal v. 
United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1990) (courts have a duty 
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to "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute"). 
 At oral argument, counsel for L & F argued that the "to 
which he is entitled" language that follows "for exercising any 
right" in § 510 is the limiting language which supports the 
company's suggested reading of § 510.  This argument ignores the 
plain language of § 510, and implies that Congress intended "to 
which he is entitled" to actually mean only "to which he is 
entitled to receive in the future."  If we were to read § 510 in 
this manner, it would render the remainder of the section, which 
prohibits employer interference "with the attainment of any right 
to which [the employee] may become entitled under the plan[]," 
superfluous.  The Supreme Court has commented that its cases 
"express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so 
as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment." 
Pa. Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 
(1990).  We, of course, share this reluctance and reject L & F's 
suggested reading of § 510. 
 If we were to accept L & F's assertion that § 510 only 
protects individuals with an expectation of future benefits, 
employers would be free to pay ERISA benefits to an employee and 
then discharge the employee for having exercised his or her 
rights to the benefits.  L & F's suggested reading of § 510 would 
allow an employer to force an employee to choose between losing 
his or her job for exercising his or her right to ERISA-protected 
benefits or keeping his or her job by forgoing his or her right 
to the benefits, a quintessential Hobson's choice.  Reading § 510 
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to permit this type of behavior by employers would likely result 
in many employees forgoing their rights to ERISA-protected 
benefits, which, in turn, would frustrate the purposes behind 
Congress' enactment of ERISA. 
 It may be true that, in practice, few employers would 
terminate an employee after paying the employee his or her ERISA-
protected benefits.  But it is not hard to imagine several 
situations in which an employer would have a motivation to embark 
upon such a course of action.  For example, an employer might 
decide to terminate an employee for exercising rights to ERISA-
protected benefits, after having paid the benefits, to deter 
other employees from exercising their rights to similar benefits. 
Likewise, an employer who had been searching for a reason to 
terminate a particular employee might be motivated to pay the 
benefits to the employee before termination to camouflage a 
pretextual firing.  On a less vindictive level, an employer may, 
for reasons of oversight or laziness, simply not get around to 
terminating an employee until after paying the benefits.  We 
recognize that employees facing these types of situations are no 
less vulnerable than those who are terminated without receiving 
their ERISA-protected benefits, and therefore conclude that § 510 
protects employees from being terminated for exercising rights to 
ERISA-protected benefits regardless of whether they have received 
such benefits prior to termination. 
 Accordingly, we hold that § 510 of ERISA can provide an 
employee with a cause of action to challenge an employer's 
termination when the termination has allegedly occurred in 
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retaliation for the employee exercising his or her right to 
receive ERISA-protected benefits. 
III.  
 Our review of the district court's granting of L & F's 
motion for summary judgment is plenary.  Turner v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990).  To determine 
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment, we 
use the same standards employed by the district court.  Jefferson 
Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 965 F.2d 1274, 1278 
(3d Cir. 1992).  Rule 56(c) sets forth the standard for summary 
judgment, providing that summary judgment shall be granted only 
if there exists "no genuine issue of material fact."  Thus, a 
factual issue must be both material and genuine in order to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment.  To be material, the 
factual dispute must be one that might "affect the outcome of the 
suit under governing law."  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  Of course, in making our determination of 
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment, we 
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. 
Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
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 A. Burdens of Proof 
 We have held that the presumptions and shifting burdens 
of production used in employment discrimination cases are equally 
applicable in the context of discriminatory discharge cases 
brought under § 510 of ERISA.  Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 
901 F.2d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 1990).  The evidentiary playing field 
for discrimination cases has been drawn clearly by McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and its progeny. 
Accordingly, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 
of a discriminatory discharge.  If the plaintiff satisfies this 
requirement, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the discharge.  To survive summary 
judgment when the defendant articulates a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the discharge, the plaintiff must point 
to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a 
factfinder could either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated 
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an individual's 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not reason for the 
discharge.  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (citing St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993)). 
 B. L & F's Proffered Non-Discriminatory Reason for 
the Discharge 
 The district court found that Kowalski established a 
prima facie case of unlawful termination under ERISA, and L & F 
does not dispute this finding.  To dispel the inference of a 
retaliatory discharge, L & F must articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for discharging Kowalski.  We have 
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characterized this burden as "relatively light."  Fuentes v. 
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).  L & F can satisfy this 
burden of production by introducing evidence which, taken as 
true, would permit the conclusion that there was a non-
discriminatory reason for the discharge.  Id. at 763. 
 The district court correctly concluded that the record 
supports L & F's assertion that it discharged Kowalski because it 
believed that she had acted fraudulently in procuring and/or 
prolonging her disability leave.  It is clear from the record 
that L & F's human resource manager, Rob King, relied on a 
private investigator's report that stated that Kowalski had been 
working full-time while on medical disability leave.  L & F has 
articulated that its actions were motivated by its discovery of 
Kowalski's alleged fraud.  L & F's proffer of this legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Kowalski satisfies the 
"light" burden we have set forth in Fuentes. 
 C. Kowalski's Evidence of Pretext 
 Given that L & F was able to proffer a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Kowalski, to avoid summary 
judgment, Kowalski must point to evidence from which the court 
could reasonably infer that L & F's proffered reasons were 
fabricated (i.e., pretextual).  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  We 
noted that meeting this burden requires the plaintiff to put 
forth evidence demonstrating that the employer's proffered non-
discriminatory reason "was either a post hoc fabrication or 
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that 
is, the proffered reason is a pretext)."  Id. 
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 At a minimum, Kowalski must put forward enough evidence 
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether L & F's 
proffered reasons for the discharge were pretextual.  To do this, 
Kowalski must "demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the 
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of 
credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the 
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons."  Id. at 765. 
 The district court held that "there is nothing [in the 
record that] creates a genuine issue of fact that defendant's 
reason for terminating plaintiff is pretextual."  Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 10.  The court correctly observed that, "even if defendant 
wrongly believed plaintiff acted fraudulently in procuring her 
disability leave, if defendant acted upon such a belief it cannot 
be held guilty of retaliatory discharge."  Id. at 11.  The 
district court concluded that "[p]laintiff has offered no 
evidence to suggest that defendant acted in bad faith when 
relying upon the investigator's report."  Id. 
 Kowalski argues that the evidence contradicts the 
defendant's proffered reason and demonstrates the existence of 
material issues of fact as to the defendant's good faith in 
relying on the results of the investigation to conclude that 
Kowalski was working while on disability.  We agree.  The 
district court was too quick to conclude that the accuracy of the 
private investigator's report was irrelevant.  The facial 
accuracy and reliability of the report is probative of whether 
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L & F acted in good faith reliance upon the report's conclusions: 
the less reliable the report may appear, the greater the 
likelihood that King's reliance on it to justify his actions was 
pretextual. 
 A review of the circumstances surrounding the 
preparation of the investigator's report reveals that King should 
have cast a wary eye toward its factual conclusions.  The 
investigator never observed Kowalski working at her "full-time 
cleaning job," despite the fact that he conducted three days of 
surveillance.  In addition, the report only contained the 
investigator's summary of two witnesses' statements and not the 
witnesses' actual statements.  The investigator's report also 
indicated that Kowalski had actually performed cleaning services 
while on medical leave, despite the fact that neither of the 
witnesses stated that they actually saw Kowalski perform the 
services.  
 Though not determinative, it is also relevant that L & 
F never offered the report into evidence.  If the report itself 
justified King's good faith reliance, presumably L & F would have 
attached it to its summary judgment motion.  In fact, in its 
brief, L & F states "[p]erhaps the report was inaccurate; 
nevertheless, it was the basis for the adverse action as the 
decision maker took it to be accurate."  L & F Br. at 16.  Given 
that L & F's termination of Kowalski was admittedly based 
entirely on the report, the facial reliability of the report is 
relevant to determining whether King, L & F's human resource 
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manager, actually relied in good faith upon the report's 
conclusions in terminating Kowalski. 
 Kowalski offers other facts to suggest that L & F's 
reliance on the conclusions of the report was pretextual, and 
that she was actually fired for exercising her right to the 
disability benefits.  Kowalski argues that the timing of her 
discharge (which occurred shortly after she had taken her second 
leave of absence) indicates that she was discharged for having 
taken two periods of disability instead of one.  In addition, 
Kowalski claims that L & F had no basis to investigate her 
because she had not been on leave longer than is normal for a 
bunionectomy.  She also points out that L & F previously had no 
practice of investigating employees who were on disability for 
long periods of time.  It is also significant that King's reasons 
for procuring the investigator's report have changed over the 
course of this litigation.  As noted, initially he indicated that 
he began investigating Kowalski because she had been out of work 
longer than normal for a bunionectomy.  App. at 60.  At a later 
point, King indicated that he ordered the investigation because 
he had received a tip that the plaintiff was working while on 
disability.  App. at 62.  Although these facts far from establish 
that L & F's proffered reason for discharging Kowalski was 
pretextual, when viewed alongside the very serious questions 
regarding the reliability of the investigator's report, they do 
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether L & F's 
proffered reason for terminating Kowalski was pretextual. 
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 As such, we will vacate the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of L & F, and remand the case 
to the district court.  Upon remand, we suggest that the district 
court order the production of the investigator's report.  In 
doing so, we emphasize that the ambiguities surrounding the 
report's conclusions indicate that a finding that L & F relied in 
good faith on the report, without having the report itself in 
evidence, is inappropriate in this case at the summary judgment 
stage.  We do not hold, however, that a defendant must always put 
an investigative report (or another piece of evidence) upon which 
he or she relies into the record.  We simply hold that in this 
case, where the contents of the primary piece of evidence upon 
which the defendant relies is contradicted by witness testimony 
and is not even introduced, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
 D. Kowalski's Evidence of Intent 
 As an alternative basis for granting summary judgment 
in favor of L & F, the district court determined that Kowalski 
failed to offer any evidence of L & F's specific intent to 
violate ERISA.  Kowalski argues that there were sufficient facts 
available to the district court for it to reasonably infer that L 
& F acted with a discriminatory intent.  We agree.  We note that 
in this case, we need not and do not determine whether specific 
intent is an essential element of a § 510 cause of action 
because, whether or not such intent is required, there was 
sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the essential 
elements of § 510. 
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 The same facts Kowalski offered to show that L & F's 
proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating her was 
pretextual can be used to infer L & F's specific intent to 
violate ERISA.  In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme 
Court commented that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons 
put forward by the defendant (particularly if [the] disbelief is 
accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the 
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination."  113 S. Ct. at 2749.  Indeed, we have similarly 
held that, "if the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficient 
to discredit the defendant's proffered reasons, to survive 
summary judgment plaintiff need not also come forward with 
additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima 
facie case."  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 784.  Under this standard, 
Kowalski has offered enough evidence, which we specified in 
section III-C of this opinion, to survive summary judgment on the 
issue of whether L & F's actions demonstrated a specific intent 
to violate § 510 of ERISA. 
 As such, we cannot sustain the district court's 
conclusion that Kowalski has offered no evidence of L & F's 
specific intent to violation § 510 of ERISA. 
19 
IV. 
 In sum, we hold that Kowalski, as an employee who 
claims to have been terminated by her employer for having 
exercised her right to disability benefits arising out of her two 
bunionectomies, raised a cognizable claim under § 510 of ERISA 
notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her 
employer prior to termination.  We vacate the judgment of the 
district court on the basis that Kowalski presented enough 
evidence to suggest that material issues of fact exist as to 
whether L & F's reliance on the investigator's report was 
pretextual.  Based on the evidence in the record before us (and 
in part on what evidence is not before us, i.e., the report), 
Kowalski has successfully stood her ground against L & F's motion 
for summary judgment. 
